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ANOTHER BITE AT THE APPLE FOR TRADE
SECRET PROTECTION: WHY STRONGER
FEDERAL LAWS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT
A CORPORATION’S MOST VALUABLE
PROPERTY1
“There are only two categories of companies affected by
trade-secret theft: those that know they’ve been
compromised and those that don’t know it yet.”2
ABSTRACT
Trade secrets are one of a corporation’s most valuable assets.
However, they lack adequate protection under federal law, leaving them
vulnerable to theft and misappropriation. As technology advances, it
becomes easier and less time consuming for individuals and entities to
access and steal trade secrets to a corporation’s detriment. Most often
these thefts involve stealing trade secrets in an intangible form. Current
legislation fails to adequately protect intangible trade secrets, leaving them
vulnerable to theft. An amendment to the National Stolen Property Act that
encompasses intangible trade secrets would close a loophole that currently
exists relating to intangible assets, allowing for unanimity in similar cases
of trade secret theft. Moreover, a federal civil statute would provide an
overarching framework for civil trade secrets protection and would allow
corporations with trade secret theft claims access to federal courts that can
provide civil remedies and emergency relief for diverse parties from
different states or countries.
INTRODUCTION
Profitable use of resources drives economic development in the United
States through creating today’s most advanced technologies and medicines.3
These ideas, technologies, and medicines are classified as United States
1. On the eve of publication of this Note, the United States Congress passed, and President
Obama signed into law, the Defend Trade Secrets Act, implementing a federal civil trade secrets
statute similar to the one called for in this Note. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016). I believe that Congress was correct in passing the bill, for reasons
that will be discussed in Part V of this Note. By passing the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Congress
has opened the doors of federal courts to trade secret owners with civil trade secrets claims, has
allowed for emergency relief through ex parte seizure to prevent further harm to trade secret
owners, and provided civil injunction and damage remedies to compensate trade secret owners.
2. David S. Almeling, Recent Trade Secret Reform – And What Else Needs to Change,
LAW360 (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.omm.com/files/upload/David%20Almeling%20Article%20
RE%20Trade%20Secret%20Reform.pdf.
3. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 2 (2016), http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/IntellectualPropertyReport-October20
05.pdf.
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intellectual property.4 Intellectual property includes four specific types of
property: copyright, trademark, patent, and trade secrets, and each come
with its own form of protections.5 However, while copyrights, trademarks,
and patents are protected through federal laws, trade secrets are protected
through state and common law, leaving them vulnerable to weaker
protection despite their substantial economic value.6 Trade secrets are
classified as any “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique or process.”7 More specifically, to be
considered a trade secret, a corporation must: (i) “derive[] independent
economic value, actual or potential,” from the secret, (ii) make a reasonable
effort to maintain the secret’s confidentiality, and (iii) not be “readily
ascertainable by proper means” to anyone that can economically benefit
from the trade secret’s value or disclosure.8 Trade secret misappropriation
occurs when an individual or entity obtains a trade secret through “improper
means” or discloses or uses a trade secret without the owner’s consent.9
A corporation’s trade secrets are extremely valuable,10 and today, both
insiders and outsiders pose great threats of misappropriation.11 Outside
threats most often stem from “individuals, rival companies, and foreign
governments” who steal trade secrets to reap substantial economic
benefits.12 Theft and misappropriation of trade secrets is egregiously
harmful to corporations, and in some circumstances, leads to dissolution.13
In 2008, companies around the world reportedly lost an average of $4.6
million worth of intellectual property because of theft and disclosure
through security breaches.14 A corporation’s trade secrets are
“commercially valuable . . . [and] kept confidential by companies because,
by virtue of their secrecy, they give companies an edge in a competitive
marketplace.”15 In addition to affecting the economic stability of a
4. Id.
5. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS:
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 4 (2014).
6. Id.
7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (2005).
8. Id.
9. See generally id. § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 438 (2005).
10. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 10–13 [hereinafter CASE FOR
ENHANCED PROTECTION], https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/file
s/Final%20TPP%20Trade%20Secrets%208_0.pdf.
11. See Dave Drab, Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Defending Against the
Pickpockets of the New Millennium, XEROX GLOBAL SERVICES 5–8 (2003), http://www.xerox.co
m/downloads/wpaper/x/xgs_business_insight_economic_espionage.pdf.
12. YEH, supra note 5, at 1.
13. See Jon Swartz, Modern Thieves Prefer Computers to Guns/Online Crime Is Seldom
Reported, Hard to Detect, S.F. GATE (Mar. 25, 1997, 4:00AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/artic
le/Modern-Thieves-Prefer-Computers-to-Guns-Online-2848175.php.
14. CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10, at 11.
15. H.R. REP. NO. 113-657, at 5 (2014).
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corporation, misappropriation of trade secrets can have a broader impact on
the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP).16 Economic loss resulting
from trade secret theft is estimated to be between 1 and 3 percent of the
United States’ GDP.17 More specifically, in the United States alone,
economic losses suffered from cybercrime were reported to be between $24
and $120 billion.18 This egregious economic harm faced by corporations
and the United States as a result of more frequent trade secret theft, coupled
with the economic value of trade secrets, reiterates the need for stronger and
more effective legal protection for trade secrets.
The rise in threats and number of successful misappropriations of trade
secrets is largely due to new technology.19 As technology becomes more
advanced, it becomes easier and less time consuming for individuals and
entities to access and steal trade secrets to a corporation’s detriment.20
Corporations and the U.S. government both derive great economic value
from trade secrets.21 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates the value of
trade secrets to publicly traded corporations to be about $5 trillion.22
Moreover, for many corporations, trade secrets can make up as much as
two-thirds of a corporation’s information portfolio.23 For example,
companies that are considered “knowledge-intensive” (e.g., scientific and
technology companies), trade secrets comprise between 70 and 80 percent
of their information portfolios.24 A study conducted by the National Science
Foundation showed that about half of the companies surveyed with research
and development activity categorized trade secret protection as the most
important form of intellectual property protection.25 Even those companies
without research and development recognized the importance of trade
secrets and categorized them as the second most important form of
16. See YEH, supra note 5, at 14.
17. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE & PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE
SECRETS AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL THREATS 3 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/economic-impact.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE
SECRET THEFT].
18. Id. at 12. Losses may be underestimated due to a difficulty in calculation because of the
long lasting effects of trade secret theft. Id.
19. See Dylan W. Wiseman & Kwabena A. Appenteng, The Defend Trade Secret Act of 2015:
Proposed Legislation Would Open the Federal Courthouse Door for Trade Secret
Misappropriation Claims, LITTLER (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/defend-trade-secrets-act-2015-proposed-legislation-would-open-federal.
20. YEH, supra note 5, at 1.
21. See generally CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10.
22. YEH, supra note 5, at 14.
23. CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10, at 10. An information portfolio is a
compilation of data that includes valuable intellectual property such as, customer lists and records,
trade secrets, corporate plans, projected sales and financial statements. FORRESTER CONSULTING,
THE VALUE OF CORPORATE TRADE SECRETS 3 (2010), https://www.nsi.org/pdf/reports/The%20V
alue%20of%20Corporate%20Secrets.pdf.
24. CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10, at 10.
25. Id.
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intellectual property protection.26 However, despite their extensive value,
trade secrets remain especially vulnerable to theft and misappropriation due
to “lackluster legal protection.”27
As the laws currently stand, the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)28
and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA)29 are the two federal criminal
statutes used to protect against trade secret theft. The NSPA prohibits the
transporting, transferring, or transmitting of any “goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money” with the knowledge that the same has
been stolen.30 The EEA makes illegal the theft or copying of a trade secret
that is “produced for or placed in interstate commerce” with the knowledge
that the offense will harm the trade secret owner.31 However, in two federal
Second Circuit cases, United States v. Aleynikov32 and United States v.
Agrawal,33 the application of these statutes to the particular facts in each
case led to different outcomes. In Aleynikov, the Second Circuit overturned
both the NSPA and EEA convictions because Aleynikov uploaded, then
downloaded, the trade secret in intangible form, which did not constitute
“goods, wares, or merchandise” under the NSPA, and was not “produced
for or placed in interstate commerce” under the EEA.34 In contrast, the
Second Circuit in Agrawal upheld both the NSPA and EEA convictions
because Agrawal’s printing of the source code and taking it to his home
constituted a transfer of “goods, wares, or merchandise” under the NSPA,
and the source code was “produced for or placed in interstate commerce”
under the EEA.35 The only difference between these two Second Circuit
cases is the intangibility of Aleynikov’s uploading and downloading of
source code and the tangibility of the paper code that Agrawal printed out
and took to his home.36 This distinction exemplifies the holes in the current
federal criminal statutes protecting trade secrets because convictions for
trade secret theft should not focus on the tangibility of the trade secret, but
rather the fact that a trade secret was stolen to begin with.
In addition to the problem with these criminal statutes, there is no
federal civil trade secrets statue allowing corporations to bring private
actions in federal court. A federal statute would not only allow trade secret
claims to be brought in federal court, but would also provide for civil
remedies such as injunctions and damages. Currently, a corporation will
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id. at 11.
28. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
29. See generally id. §§ 1831–1832.
30. Id. § 2314.
31. Id. § 1832.
32. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
33. United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013).
34. See generally Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71.
35. See generally Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235.
36. See generally id.; Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71.
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bring a civil trade secret action in federal court by combining a trade secret
claim with its patent claims.37 Because federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over patent claims, trade secret claims brought in conjunction
with patent claims are litigated in federal court.38 This practice has caused
the amount of trade secret litigation in federal courts to double from 1988 to
1995, double again from 1995 to 2004, and is projected to double a third
time by the year 2017.39 Conversely, state courts have not experienced this
increase as litigation in state courts has not doubled in the past fifteen years
and is not projected to double for at least the next twenty years.40 Due to the
lack of a uniform federal civil trade secrets statute, when a trade secret
claim is brought in federal court, the court must choose and apply a single
state’s trade secret law, subjecting that case to choice of law issues and
leaving litigants unsure of which state’s law will be applied in their case.41
Moreover, courts make it difficult for a corporation to predict the viability
of its trade secret claim by applying state laws inconsistently.42 A federal
civil trade secrets statute would provide access to federal courts for stand-
alone trade secrets claims,43 along with consistency and uniformity across
the current fifty-state system.44
Part I of this Note discusses the economic and noneconomic (i.e., the
corporation’s reputation, image, goodwill, and competitive advantage) harm
corporations face as a result of trade secret theft. Part II explores how the
Internet contributes to the exacerbation of trade secret theft. Part III
discusses the current federal and state law protections against trade secret
theft. Part IV analyzes two federal cases, United States v. Aleynikov45 and
United States v. Agrawal,46 both decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which, despite substantially similar facts,
reached two different outcomes.47 In addition, this Part highlights the July
37. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts,
46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 70 (2010) [hereinafter Almeling et al., Litigation in State Courts].
38. See id.
39. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2010).
40. Almeling et al., Litigation in State Courts, supra note 37, at 67. State courts are less likely
to cite persuasive authority because each state has their own trade secret laws, making federal
courts more favorable to plaintiff corporations. Id at 73, 76–77.
41. See Almeling, supra note 2.
42. See id.
43. See Alden F. Abbott, Strengthening Property Rights and the U.S. Economy Through
Federal Trade Secret Protection, HERITAGE FOUND. 4 (Jun. 25, 2014),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM128.pdf.
44. See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 769, 770 (2009) [hereinafter Almeling, Four Reasons].
45. See generally United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
46. See generally United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013).
47. The foregoing analysis on tangibility is specific to the decisions handed down in the
Second Circuit.
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7, 2015 decision in People v. Aleynikov,48 where the same claims of
misappropriation from the earlier federal case against Aleynikov were
brought in state court under New York’s penal code. Similar to the Second
Circuit, the New York State Supreme Court found that the form with which
Aleynikov stole the trade secret did not satisfy theft as set out in the penal
code. This state case shows that state laws are also insufficient for
protecting trade secrets.49 Finally, Part V offers a solution to the problem
with the EEA and NSPA by suggesting an amendment to the NSPA.
Further, this Part offers support for, and improvements to, the proposed
federal civil trade secrets legislation, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA),
that is intended to provide a uniform federal private action for trade secret
misappropriation.
I. TRADE SECRET THEFT’S ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC
HARM TO CORPORATIONS
During 2000 and 2001, Fortune 1000 companies reported a loss of
intellectual property information totaling between $53 and $59 million.50
Despite the vast economic harm caused by misappropriation of trade
secrets, there is no consensus regarding the exact value of corporations’
trade secrets.51 Further, there are several difficulties in measuring the exact
effects theft has on business in the United States.52 Several studies have
been conducted to quantify the harm caused by trade secret theft. These
studies have found that trade secrets are “fundamental building blocks” that
influence “economic growth . . . by enhancing economic security and
stability.”53 Furthermore, in the United States, publicly traded companies
own about $5 trillion worth of trade secrets.54 In a proxy study, researchers
used “illicit economic activity” to estimate the general effect of trade secret
theft.55 The study found that when compared to the “illicit economic
activity” of occupational fraud (i.e., United States tax evasion, narcotics
trafficking, black market activities, illicit financial flows, copyright
infringement, and software piracy), the loss attributed to trade secret theft
ranged from 0.1 percent to 5 percent of the United States’ GDP.56 Another
survey showed that a single corporation experienced an economic loss of up
48. People v. Aleynikov, 15 N.Y.S.3d 587, 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
49. See generally id.
50. Drab, supra note 11, at 3 (citing ASIS INT’L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
LOSS 13 (2007)).
51. See ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT, supra note 17, at 7.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 2.
54. CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10, at 10.
55. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT, supra note 17, at 8.
56. Id. at 8–9.
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to $5.5 million.57 The survey also showed that the costs of attempted trade
secret theft were either comparable or higher in 2005 than 2004.58
In one specific instance, Interactive Television Technologies, a
corporation that created television devices with data capabilities allowing
customers to browse the web on their television sets, experienced an
internal network breach where virtual intruders stole trade secrets
amounting to an estimated $250 million.59 The corporation has since gone
out of business.60 In another example, a United States automobile
corporation lost an estimated $500 million after hackers broke into the
corporation’s secure computer network.61 This substantial loss was due to
theft of confidential designs intended for future cars that ended up in the
hands of the corporation’s competitor.62 From these examples, it is clear
that corporations that fall victim to trade secret theft experience a “loss of
competitive advantage” as well as grave economic harm.63
In addition to economic losses, corporations reported noneconomic
losses in “reputation, image, goodwill, competitive advantage, core
technology, and profitability.”64 Trade secret misappropriation deprives a
corporation of its competitive advantage by denying the corporation the
ability to be the first developer in a specific field.65 This deprivation also
results in harm to the corporation’s reputation because of the rapid pace
companies enter high technology markets.66 Misappropriation also affects
customer and employee goodwill.67 Customers often lose confidence in a
corporation after instances of trade secret theft resulting in loss of future
sales of products.68 Loss of customers may also occur if the misappropriator
is able to replicate and sell the corporation’s product for a lower price.69
The loss of future sales and production harms employee goodwill and
causes a decrease in morale due to employees feeling that their work
product is “siphoned off by the misappropriator.”70 Furthermore, when
corporations implement stronger security measures to protect these trade
57. ASIS INT’L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 13 (2007),
https://foundation.asisonline.org/FoundationResearch/Publications/Documents/trendsinproprietary
informationloss.pdf [hereinafter ASIS INT’L, TRENDS].
58. Id.
59. Swartz, supra note 13.
60. See id.
61. George J. Moscarino & Michel R. Shumaker, Changing Times, Changing Crimes: The
Criminal’s Newest Weapon and the U.S.’s Response, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 597, 603–04 (1998).
62. Id.
63. Drab, supra note 11, at 2.
64. ASIS INT’L, TRENDS, supra note 57.
65. See Edmond Gabbay, All The King’s Horses – Irreparable Harm in Trade Secret
Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 804, 824–25 (1984).
66. Id. at 825.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 826.
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secrets, employees can react adversely, again decreasing employee
goodwill.71
When assessing damages for harms in trade secret suits, companies can
include actual loss,72 reasonable royalties, and unjust enrichment.73 Actual
damages are recovered for a corporation’s lost revenues, that result from
“lost sales of the protected product or service, lost sales of complementary
products and services, and price erosion resulting from the
misappropriator’s entry into the market with a competitive good or
service.”74 In successful cases alleging unjust enrichment, the plaintiff is
afforded remedies equal to the defendant’s “wrongfully gained net
profits.”75 Reasonable royalties compensation, a form of damages for actual
loss to a plaintiff, is awarded for the use of trade secrets that “a willing
licensor and willing licensee” would have negotiated and entered into a
contract for prior to the theft.76 This type of compensation is based on the
idea that had the defendant negotiated a contract for a license to use the
trade secret, the plaintiff would have profited from that license.77 The vast
economic harm incurred from trade secret theft, along with risks to the
competitiveness of the business market, make implementing stronger trade
secrets protections necessary.
II. HOW THE INTERNET EXACERBATES THE HARM CAUSED
TO CORPORATIONS BY TRADE SECRET THEFT
“If you want to get away with a crime today, do it using a computer.”78
Today, there is no longer a need to enter a corporation’s premises to steal its
trade secrets.79 The anonymity of computer theft, coupled with the fact that
trade secrets are often more valuable than currency, has resulted in an
explosion of computer crime.80 For example, it has been said that, “[i]f I
want to steal money, a computer is a much better tool than a handgun . . . .
It would take me a long time to get $10 million with a handgun.”81 A
71. Id.
72. Glenn Perdue, The Broad Spectrum of Trade Secret Damages, ABA INTELL. PROP. LITIG.
COMMITTEE (Apr.18, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles
/spring2012-0412-broad-spectrum-trade-secret-damages.html.
73. Marc J. Pensabene & Christopher E. Loh, How to Assess Trade Secret Damages,
MANAGING IP (June 2006), http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/attachme
nt359.pdf.
74. Perdue, supra note 72.
75. Id. It should be noted that plaintiffs cannot receive damages for unjust enrichment if the
amount of profits from sales considered is already included in the calculation of actual loss. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Moscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 604 (citing Jeffery Young, Spies Like Us,
FORBES (June 3, 1996) at 20).
79. Id. at 602.
80. See id. at 603–04.
81. Swartz, supra note 13.
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substantial rise in theft by electronic means has occurred as the Internet has
become increasingly important for commerce.82 Although innovative
technology, such as the Internet, is beneficial to corporations because it can
make employee operations more efficient, this technology allows a
corporation’s most valuable information to be susceptible to theft because
of its vulnerability to security breaches.83
One major challenge that corporations face when developing
protections for their trade secrets is hackers.84 The Internet has helped
hackers advance from “formerly annoying, but relatively harmless”
individuals, to “accomplished international criminals.”85 Companies
generally respond to hacking by continuously increasing their computer
security systems.86 However, these efforts are ineffective as hackers have
developed several techniques to successfully breach these heightened
security systems.87 Hacker techniques, and the computer equipment needed
to perform these techniques, such as “flash drives, smart phones [and] cloud
based storage devices,”88 are relatively inexpensive and have been
extremely successful.89 The increasing equipment available that can be used
to steal trade secrets also makes it easier for employees to engage in trade
secret theft.90
The relative ease of success and low price of these new technologies
have caused computer crimes to increase exponentially.91 For example,
between 1990 and 1995, economic espionage increased 300 percent because
the Internet allowed trade secret information to be misappropriated with
greater ease.92 People looking to steal valuable information use the Internet
with the comfort of knowing that their identity, location, and affiliation will
remain anonymous.93 An estimate by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
reported that approximately 95 percent of “computer intrusions” go
unnoticed because hackers know how to successfully and discretely access
a system without being discovered.94 In addition, this anonymity attracts
hackers to computer theft because it “softens or even erases” the intruder’s
feelings of guilt.95 These factors have led to a substantial increase in
electronic trade secret theft.
82. See id.
83. Drab, supra note 11, at 3.
84. See id. at 7.
85. Moscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 601.
86. Id. at 602.
87. Id.
88. Wiseman & Appenteng, supra note 19, at 1.
89. Moscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 603.
90. SeeWiseman & Appenteng, supra note 19, at 1.
91. SeeMoscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 603.
92. Drab, supra note 11, at 5.
93. Id.
94. Moscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 604.
95. Id.
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Although hackers pose a substantial problem to corporations trying to
protect their trade secrets, the number one threat of trade secret theft comes
from employees inside a corporation.96 These workers are the “weak link”
in information security because they either intentionally leak trade secret
information or unwillingly disclose the information to spies.97 More
frequently, a competitor may, through manipulation and deceit, convince an
employee to release confidential information that should not be disclosed to
the competitor.98 Another method used to access a corporation’s trade
secrets is employee recruitment.99 Employee recruitment occurs when an
insider has been obtained by a competitor through bribery and is tasked
with acquiring confidential information.100 The collector corporation, a
corporation seeking to steal another corporation’s trade secrets, will recruit
an insider at the target corporation to steal a trade secret for the collector
corporation’s benefit.101 Employee recruitment is targeted at low-level
employees because they are easier to bribe than a corporation’s officers, or
“disgruntled employees” because they may already be looking to harm the
corporation as a form of revenge.102 Once the collector corporation obtains
an insider, that individual can easily procure and disclose trade secret
information for the collector corporation’s benefit.103
Even more appalling, some competitor corporations employ hackers to
take advantage of security weaknesses in their competitors’ computer
systems.104 Corporations that engage in these practices can face penalties
for trade secret misappropriation through vicarious liability.105 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, in Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, was the
first court to suggest the possibility of bringing a successful vicarious
liability claim relating to Minnesota’s Uniform Trade Secret Act.106 Today,
96. Drab, supra note 11, at 6.
97. Swartz, supra note 13.
98. Drab, supra note 11, at 7.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. SeeMoscarino & Shumaker, supra note 61, at 602.
105. Tanya J. Dobash, Recent Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: Trade Secret Theft &
Employer Vicarious Liability In Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc., 29 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 375, 380 (2002).
106. Id. at 384. In the case of Hagen v. Burmeister, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
American Agency, Inc., was not vicariously liable for Hagen’s solicitation of over 200 Burmeister
& Associate customers—in violation of a noncompete and confidentiality agreement classifying
customer information as trade secrets—because Burmeister did not present evidence that it was
foreseeable for employees of insurance agencies to engage in the misappropriation of trade
secrets. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assocs., 633 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2001). However, the Supreme
Court reasoned that vicarious liability could be imposed on employers for acts “committed within
the scope of employment” if the tort is “related to the employee’s duties” and “the tort occurs
within work-related limits of time and place.” Id. at 504 (citing Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 211
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under Hagen, a corporation can be held liable for an employee’s trade
secret theft if the employee’s misappropriation was related to the
employee’s scope of work and the theft occurred “within work-related
limits of time and place.”107 Another way a corporation can be held
vicariously liable is if it is involved in, has knowledge of, or endorses an
employee’s misappropriation of another corporation’s trade secrets.108
The rationales for vicarious liability include fairness and economic
justifications.109 The main fairness justification, endorsed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Hagen, is that an employer should bear the costs resulting
from employee misconduct if the misconduct is foreseeable and related to
the employee’s necessary duties because they are part of the “costs of doing
business.”110 In other words, it would be unjust for employers to profit from
their employees’ commendable work without being held responsible for any
improper actions employees took to benefit the corporation.111 The main
economic rationale for vicarious liability is based on the concept of risk
sharing: the corporation provides “deep pockets” for plaintiffs seeking
recovery and a secondary source for damage recovery.112 An additional
justification is that vicarious liability will encourage better hiring and
oversight practices by employers, and provides a “financial incentive” to
regulate and restrain employees.113 This is representative of the Hagen
court’s willingness to “enforce corporate responsibility.”114
III. CURRENT TRADE SECRET PROTECTIONS
Prior to 1996, the most prominent federal statute that protected trade
secrets was the Trade Secrets Act enacted in 1948, which made it a crime
for federal employees and contractors to disclose any confidential
information, including trade secrets.115 In 1996, Congress passed the EEA116
to broaden the protection of trade secrets.117 Congress sought to remedy
several concerns about competitors and foreign nations who steal a
corporation’s trade secrets to gain an economic advantage.118 Sections 1831
and 1832 of the EEA target economic espionage and theft of trade secrets
N.W.2d 783,786 (Minn. 1973)). The court based their justification for vicarious liability on the
fact that employee actions are a “cost of doing business.” Hagen, 633 N.W.2d at 504.
107. Dobash, supra note 105, at 407.
108. See id. at 380.
109. Id. at 394.
110. Id. at 394–95.
111. See id. at 394–95.
112. Id. at 395.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 396.
115. YEH, supra note 5, at 7.
116. See generally Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1832 (2012).
117. YEH, supra note 5, at 7.
118. Id.
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respectively.119 Section 1831 of the EEA provides for imprisonment of
fifteen years or a substantial fine for anyone who, with the intent or
knowledge that their offense will economically benefit a foreign entity,
“steals or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret.”120
Section 1832 of the EEA protects against the theft of trade secrets by
imposing a fine or imprisonment on any person who intends to “convert a
trade secret” that is “related to a product or service used in or intended for
use in interstate or foreign commerce” with the knowledge that the offense
will cause harm to the owner and economically benefit third parties.121
Congress amended the EEA in 2012 to broaden the interstate commerce
language to expand the scope of trade secret protection.122
The NSPA protects trade secrets by criminalizing the transfer of stolen
goods.123 The NSPA provides criminal sanctions of a fine or imprisonment
up to ten years for anyone who “transports, transmits, or transfers . . . any
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money,” through channels of
interstate commerce with the knowledge that the property is stolen or has
been converted through fraudulent means.124 Furthermore, fines and
imprisonment can be imposed on anyone who “with unlawful or fraudulent
intent” puts into the stream of interstate commerce any “falsely made,
forged, altered, or counterfeited securities” with the knowledge that these
materials are “forged, altered, or counterfeited.”125
In addition to these two federal statutes, states also have their own trade
secret laws, which are used by corporations as their primary source of trade
secret misappropriation protection.126 A majority of states drafted and
enacted statutes similar to the model set forth in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA).127 The UTSA provides definitions for the terms “trade secret,”
“improper means,” and “misappropriation.”128 It also sets forth equitable
remedies for corporations whose trade secrets are misappropriated, such as
injunctions, damages for the actual economic loss the corporation suffered
and the “unjust enrichment” it causes another party, and attorneys’ fees for
actions taken in “bad faith.”129
Although the UTSA establishes a model for states to follow when
enacting their own laws, Massachusetts and New York have yet to enact
119. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1832.
120. Id. § 1831.
121. Id. § 1832.
122. See id. The 2012 amendment is further discussed in Part V as support for the proposition
that the National Stolen Property Act should be amended.
123. See generally id. § 2314.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. YEH, supra note 5, at 6.
127. Id.
128. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 438 (2005).
129. See id. §§ 2–3.
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any version of the UTSA and instead protect their trade secrets primarily
through the common law.130 In addition to its common law, New York uses
sections 156.30 and 165.07 of its Penal Code to protect “computer related
material” and “scientific material,” respectively.131 New York Penal Code
section 156.30 relates to the copying of “computer related material,” and
makes it a Class E felony to (i) copy computer related material when a
person “intentionally and wrongfully deprives or appropriates” an owner of
economic value or (ii) copy computer material with the “intent to commit or
attempt to commit or further the commission of any felony.”132 New York
also seeks to protect a specific type of trade secret, “secret scientific
material,” through section 165.07 of its penal code, which provides criminal
penalties for the unlawful use of any “secret scientific material” with the
“intent to appropriate” or make use of the material through the process of
“tangible reproduction or representation” of such material.133
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE EEA AND
NSPA
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ inconsistent application of the
EEA and NSPA in United States v. Aleynikov and United States v. Agrawal
illustrates the need for refined statutory language. In April of 2011, the
Second Circuit in United States v. Aleynikov overturned Sergey
Aleynikov’s conviction of violating the EEA and NSPA.134 Aleynikov was
a computer programmer who developed source code for Goldman Sachs’
high-frequency trading system.135 A high-frequency trading system is a
system that makes large volume trades in securities in a fraction of a second
based on a computer algorithm.136 More specifically, Aleynikov’s position
at Goldman Sachs required him to write source code for the “infrastructure
programs that facilitate the flow of information throughout the trading
system and monitor the system’s performance.”137 During the creation of
the source code, Aleynikov was exposed to secret scientific material that
constituted Goldman Sachs’ trade secrets, because the material provided
economic benefit to Goldman Sachs, was closely safeguarded, and was not
readily ascertainable to the public.138
130. Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secret Legislation, TRADING SECRETS (Aug. 26, 2015),
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/latest-update-on-federal-trade-secret-legislation/.
131. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.30, 165.07 (McKinney 2012). It should be noted
that these are the statutes at issue later in the case of People v. Aleynikov. See People v.
Aleynikov, 15 N.Y.S.3d 587, 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
132. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.30.
133. Id. § 165.07.
134. See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2012).
135. Id. at 73.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 74.
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Aleynikov’s source code knowledge proved to be economically
beneficial when he received an offer from Teza Technologies LLC (Teza)
to develop their high-frequency trading system in six months’ time.139 Once
hired by Teza, Aleynikov’s salary more than doubled, increasing from
$400,000 per year at Goldman Sachs to $1 million per year at Teza.140 The
issue in this case occurred when Aleynikov, before leaving Goldman Sachs,
uploaded Goldman’s source code to a server in Germany and subsequently
downloaded it to his home computer and other storage devices in New
Jersey.141 He was charged with violation of the EEA because he
downloaded a trade secret that was “related to or included in a product that
is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce,” and the NSPA
for transferring “in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money,” which he knew were stolen or
fraudulently transferred.142 The source code constituted a trade secret
because the source code, as part of the high-frequency trading system,
yielded “enormous profits” for Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs “went to
great lengths” to keep the code confidential, and the code was not for sale
or available for licensing.143
The Second Circuit reversed Aleynikov’s conviction under both the
NSPA and EEA.144 The court concluded that the NSPA does not apply to
“purely intangible” property.145 Under the NSPA, the court reasoned that
Aleynikov’s upload and subsequent download of the source code did not
constitute the stealing of “goods, wares, or merchandise” because he “stole
purely intangible property” that was taken in an intangible form, which is
not covered by the language of the statute.146 The court also reversed
Aleynikov’s conviction under the EEA, finding that the source code as a
part of Goldman Sachs’ high-frequency trading system was not “produced
for nor placed in interstate or foreign commerce” because Goldman Sachs
did not intend to sell or license their system to anyone.”147 When
interpreting the EEA, the court recognized a jurisdictional limitation that
the products must “be ‘produced for’ or ‘placed in’ interstate or foreign
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. None of the information downloaded by Aleynikov was his own intellectual property.
In fact, Goldman Sachs did not allow Aleynikov to release open-source software, obtained from
the Internet, back into open source because Goldman believed it was their property. Michael
Lewis, Did Goldman Sachs Overstep in Criminally Charging Its Ex-Programmer?, VANITY FAIR
(Aug. 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/09/michael-lewis-goldman-
sachs-programmer.
142. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74.
143. Id. at 82.
144. See id. at 78.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 79, 82.
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commerce.”148 The Second Circuit held that because the high-frequency
trading system used by Goldman Sachs was not “produced for or placed in
interstate commerce,” it did not fall within the scope of the EEA.149
A little over a year later, the Second Circuit in United States v. Agrawal
upheld the convictions of Samarth Agrawal under the NSPA and EEA.150
Agrawal, similar to Aleynikov, was a “quantitative analyst” at Société
Générale (SocGen), working with the corporation’s high-frequency trading
system.151 SocGen’s high-frequency trading system made use of two
computer-trading systems that were used to determine which securities to
purchase and sell.152 The team that worked on the high-frequency trading
systems generated trades that led to annual revenues of $10 million for
SocGen.153 However, in June of 2009, Agrawal met with Tower Research
Capital (Tower), a hedge fund that wanted to create a high-frequency
trading system, and Agrawal assured Tower he was capable of assisting
them in building a system similar to SocGen’s system.154
Just after the meeting, Agrawal returned to SocGen in New York,
printed out over 1000 pages of source code used in their high-frequency
trading system and brought the material back to his apartment in New
Jersey.155 Charged with the same crimes as Aleynikov in United States v.
Aleynikov, Agrawal was indicted under the EEA for stealing a trade secret
that was “produced for and placed in” interstate commerce to provide an
economic benefit to himself and a competitor, and under the NSPA for
illegally transferring through interstate commerce “goods, wares,
merchandise, securities and money” worth more than $5000 with the
knowledge that the same was stolen.156 Agrawal admitted to printing the
source code and bringing it back to his apartment and the court upheld the
conviction under the NSPA.157 The Second Circuit reasoned that because he
stole the computer source code in tangible form by printing it out on paper,
Agrawal’s actions fell squarely within the definition of “goods, wares, [or]
merchandise” under the NSPA.158 The court also upheld the conviction
under the EEA, stating that the securities traded on the high-frequency
trading system were in the stream of interstate commerce, and that the
computer code was related to the trading of securities, thereby satisfying the
language and jurisdictional limitation of the EEA.159
148. Id.
149. Id. at 82.
150. See generally United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2013).
151. Id. at 237–38.
152. See id. at 238.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 240.
157. Id. at 240.
158. Id. at 244.
159. Id. at 245–46.
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The only factual difference between United States v. Aleynikov and
United States v. Agrawal is the tangibility of the stolen trade secret. The
Second Circuit overturned Aleynikov’s conviction based on the
intangibility of uploading source code, while the same court affirmed
Agrawal’s conviction based on the tangible theft of the paper code. To draw
a distinction on this trivial difference fails to adequately protect trade
secrets and secret scientific material because both defendants stole material
that derived independent economic value, were kept confidential, and were
not readily ascertainable to the public. However, Aleynikov’s conviction
was overturned because the form in which he stole the trade secret did not
constitute “goods, wares or merchandise” under the NSPA. It is problematic
that courts, when interpreting the NSPA, are focused on the form in which
trade secrets are stolen rather than the actual act of misappropriation.
Therefore, more comprehensive protection against trade secret theft is
necessary for maintaining a corporation’s economic value because it is the
actual theft of the trade secret, whether tangible or intangible, that causes
economic harm to the corporation, while benefiting both the criminal and
potential competitors who wrongfully acquired the information.
After the Second Circuit overturned Aleynikov’s conviction in federal
court, the Manhattan District Attorney aired a press release announcing that
the State of New York was now charging Aleynikov with, “accessing and
duplicating a complex proprietary and highly confidential computer source
code owned by Goldman Sachs.”160 In People v. Aleynikov, Aleynikov was
charged with two violations of New York Penal Code section 165.07,
prohibiting the illegal use of secret scientific material, and one violation of
New York Penal Code section 156.30, relating to the duplication of
“computer related material.”161 Despite a guilty jury verdict with respect to
the second count under section 165.07, the court granted Aleynikov’s
motion to dismiss.162 Similar to the Second Circuit, the New York State
Supreme Court held that no legally sufficient evidence was offered to show
that Aleynikov intended to take the code for its economic benefit or value
and that the purely intangible form and reproduction of the source code did
not fall under the statute, which is specific to “tangible reproductions.”163
The state court’s grant of Aleynikov’s motion to dismiss shows that in
addition to federal law, state law is also insufficient in protecting trade
secrets, leaving a corporation’s most valuable material with inadequate
legal protection.
160. Lewis, supra note 141.
161. People v. Aleynikov, 15 N.Y.S.3d 587, 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
162. Id.
163. Id. The Government argued that, as a policy matter, it did not make sense to allow
Aleynikov to “escape criminal liability” simply because he stole the source code in an intangible
form rather than print form. Id. at 615. This Note argues a similar point, using that fact as a basis
for amending the NSPA.
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V. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NSPA AND FEDERAL
CIVIL TRADE SECRETS STATUTE
To better protect a corporation’s trade secrets, criminal convictions of
individuals that misappropriate trade secrets, such as Aleynikov and
Agrawal, should no longer turn on whether the material is taken in tangible
or intangible form. Instead, a criminal conviction should be based on an
individual or entity taking the trade secret and using it to the owner’s
detriment, without regard to the form in which the trade secret was stolen.
Furthermore, a federal civil statute protecting trade secrets is necessary to
provide a uniform private cause of action without preempting current state
laws and would allow corporations to seek economic remedies against
employers or competitors who misappropriate trade secrets across states
with diverse protections.
From a policy perspective, allowing Aleynikov to be freed from
criminal liability because he misappropriated a trade secret electronically,164
while holding Agrawal liable because he physically printed out and took the
source code from the corporation165 does not comport with general fairness.
Therefore, in order to remedy the inconsistency between these two similar
cases at the federal level, the NSPA needs to be amended to include
intangible property in the meaning of “goods, wares, or merchandise.”
The purpose of the criminal paradigm is to provide sanctions for
wrongful actions because the public considers them to be wrong and they
violate a group interest, as opposed to an individual interest.166 In the case
of trade secret theft, the collective harm is twofold, affecting both the
corporate community, because of the economic harm caused by trade secret
theft, and the United States nationally, because of the decrease in profits
resulting from the economic harm to corporations. Furthermore, the harm to
corporations comes from the trade secrets being stolen—regardless of the
form in which the theft occurs—then disclosed or used in competing
businesses, which results in the loss of a corporation’s competitive
advantage and control of the market.
A. THEAMENDED EEA ANDAMENDING THENSPA
In response to United States v. Aleynikov, Congress passed an
amendment to the EEA, the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act
(TTSCA).167 United States Senator Patrick Leahy, a notable supporter of
intellectual property reform, introduced the amendment because he believed
164. See generally United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
165. See generally United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013).
166. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1806 (1992).
167. See Daren Orzechowski, Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act Broaden Trade
Secret Protection, WHITE& CASE (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/
amendments-economic-espionage-act-broaden-trade-secret-protection#.
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there was a need to “help ‘American companies . . . protect the products
they work so hard to develop.’”168 The TTSCA simply clarifies the existing
EEA language by replacing “a product that is produced for or placed in”
with “a product or service used in or intended for use in” interstate
commerce.169 This amendment corrects the Second Circuit’s narrow judicial
interpretation of the EEA in Aleynikov, whereby the provision applied only
to products containing trade secrets that were placed in interstate
commerce.170 The very reason the court overturned Aleynikov’s conviction
under the EEA was because the court determined the stolen code was not
“placed in interstate commerce, nor produced to be placed in interstate
commerce.”171
United States Senator Leahy urged the President to sign the TTSCA
into law in order to ensure that federal criminal laws provide adequate
protection to trade secrets that are related to a product or service that is used
in interstate commerce.172 Representative Lamar Smith, of the House of
Representatives also supported the TTSCA and recognized the need to
close the gap in federal law that was exposed in the Second Circuit’s
decision in Aleynikov.173 In passing this amendment, Representative Lamar
Smith believed the government was implementing a necessary adaptation to
the digital age.174 Similarly, Representative Jackson Lee noted the need for
protection of trade secrets that are part of software that is used internally
rather than commercially.175 The TTSCA was successfully enacted in
2012.176
Despite the TTSCA’s amendment of the EEA expanding the interstate
commerce language,177 the EEA and NSPA still do not specifically
encompass intangible property. Therefore, in order to sufficiently protect
trade secrets, the NSPA should be amended to explicitly cover the transfer
or transporting of new intangible trade secrets and methods used to
misappropriate trade secrets that did not exist in 1934. This Note proposes
an amendment to the NSPA’s language because it covers only “goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money,” leaving out the transfer of
168. Robert D. Jurrens, Fool Me Once: U.S. v. Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets
Clarification Act of 2012, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 833, 848 (2013) (citation omitted).
169. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, § 2, 126 Stat. 1627
(2012).
170. See 158 CONG. REC. S6878-03, 2012 WL 5932548 (2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
171. Id. Had Aleynikov been convicted under the amended language of the EEA, it is likely that
his conviction would have been upheld.
172. Id.
173. 158 CONG. REC. H00000-52, 2012 WL 6605649 (2012) (statement of Rep. Smith).
174. Id.
175. Jurrens, supra note 168, at 849 (citing 158 Cong. Rec H00000-52, 2012 WL 6605649
(2012) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee)).
176. Orzechowski, supra note 167.
177. See Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, § 2, 126 Stat.
1627 (2012).
2016] Another Bite at the Apple for Trade Secret Protection 595
intangible property, and in turn, excluding many trade secrets from legal
protection.178 Because courts are reluctant to alter laws passed by
Congress,179 it is Congress’s responsibility to remedy any unfairness or
inconsistencies resulting from the application of its laws. Currently, the
NSPA only punishes individuals for stealing “goods, wares, merchandise,
securities or money.”180 As seen in United States v. Aleynikov, this language
does not cover theft of trade secrets through intangible means, such as
uploading and downloading source code,181 or any future intangible means
of theft created as technology evolves. Without explicitly encompassing
theft of intangible property in the language of the NSPA, trade secrets in
intangible form are subject to judicial interpretation of the NSPA, which
has resulted in a lack of legal protection for trade secret theft. The statute
should be amended to punish whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise securities,
money, or intangible assets of the value of $5000182 or more, knowing the
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.
Furthermore, Congress should define an intangible asset in the NSPA
based on the definition of trade secrets in the UTSA. The amended NSPA
should define an intangible asset as, “information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.”183 It would then be left to the courts to decide if a
corporation both derives economic value and provides means of protection
to the intangible asset at issue in a particular case. By defining intangible
assets using the UTSA’s definition of trade secrets, Congress would
encompass intangible trade secrets not currently covered by the NSPA,
while also not overreaching because the language would not cover all
intangible assets, only those that meet the three requirements for trade
secrets set forth in the UTSA.
The supporting arguments for this amendment are similar to the
supporting arguments made by Congress when they first enacted the EEA
in 1996. The EEA was proposed primarily as a response to “theft of
proprietary economic information.”184 The House of Representatives argued
that the preexisting federal criminal statues being used to combat crimes
178. Compare Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012), with National Stolen
Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
179. See People v. Aleynikov, 15 N.Y.S.3d 587, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
180. 18 U.S.C § 2314.
181. See generally United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2012).
182. Id.
183. UNIF. TRADE SECRETACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (2005).
184. 142 CONG. REC. H10460, H104601 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer).
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relating to “theft of proprietary economic information” were drafted several
decades ago and that at the time of drafting, no one could have foreseen the
type of intellectual property that now needs protection.185 Similar arguments
apply for the amendment of the NSPA. The statue was passed in 1934
before advances in technology and the rise of the Internet. It is difficult to
imagine in 1934 members of Congress anticipating not only the existence of
a computer network, but one that puts a corporation’s intangible assets at
risk. However, now that Congress is aware of this new technology, it is
appropriate to update the NSPA to coincide with these significant
technological advances.
Another argument made in favor of enacting the EEA in 1996 was that
as a creative nation, the U.S. government must have the appropriate “legal
tools” to protect its innovations.186 The Department of Justice alerted
Congress to a loophole in the federal statutes used to protect trade secrets
prior to 1996, noting that they were insufficient in protecting the theft of
intangible property. Congress responded by acknowledging that as the
nation moves toward a technologically advanced economy, most economic
assets that need protection, such as trade secrets, would also become
intangible.187 A similar loophole is found in the NSPA because it only
applies to “physical property” and not intangible trade secrets.188 The
continuous move toward a technological economy where more assets are
becoming intangible requires an amendment to the NSPA that covers the
theft of these intangible assets.
Those who opposed the 1996 enactment of the EEA claimed that the
statute, if passed, would infringe on business practices such as employee
mobility,189 which is an argument that Congress would likely face when
amending the NSPA. Employee mobility is the ability of skilled employees
to leave a current job and begin working for another corporation, applying
their skills and knowledge to their work at the new corporation.190 The fear
is that employees will be discouraged from moving to another company
because employees would naturally take knowledge and experience from
their former job with them, and that this knowledge may unintentionally
include the knowledge of trade secrets.191 However, safeguards against
infringement on employee mobility already exist in the intent requirement
included in the NSPA. Similar to the EEA, the intent requirement in the
NSPA allows for employee mobility because it only criminalizes theft of
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See generally id.
189. See id.
190. Charles T. Graves & James A. Diboise, Do Strict Trade Secret and Non-Competition Laws
Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 324 (2007).
191. See 142 CONG. REC. H10460, H10461.
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trade secrets with the knowledge that the trade secret was stolen,192 and
does not criminalize the use of trade secrets when there is no knowledge
that they were stolen,193 or that are not encompassed by the UTSA
definition of trade secrets.194 Further, the current intent requirement would
apply to theft of all property—tangible and the added intangible, which
would be covered under the proposed amendment to the NSPA—thus
avoiding infringement on employee mobility or competition. A supporting
argument for amending the NSPA is similar to an argument made by Chuck
Schumer, United States Senator and Vice Chair of the Democratic
Conference,195 in support of the 1996 enactment of the EEA, who stated,
“[w]e cannot . . . afford to let this loophole remain in our law. American
inventiveness is the key to our economy.”196
B. A PROPOSED FEDERALCIVIL TRADE SECRETS STATUTE
In addition to amending the NSPA to protect trade secret
misappropriation, Congress should pass a federal civil trade secrets statute
similar to the DTSA of 2015, House of Representative Bill H.R. 3326,197
and Senate Bill S. 1890,198 to offer corporations a federal civil remedy for
the misappropriation of their trade secrets. The basic purpose of the
implementation of civil sanctions is to afford individuals who have been
harmed a compensation remedy.199 If corporations lose economic value
through trade secret theft, it follows that the corporation should have an
economic remedy against the employee or defendant corporation, and upon
proving a case of misappropriation, be awarded damages to be made whole
again.200
There have been several steps taken by the federal government to
implement a federal civil trade secrets statute, however, a corporation today
is still left without a federal civil cause of action to pursue when its trade
secret has been misappropriated.201 The U.S. government issued a report
entitled The Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade
Secrets, describing its intentions to “vigorously combat” theft of trade
secrets that could be disclosed to foreign governments or corporations that
may derive economic benefit from their disclosure.202 Included in this report
192. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
194. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETACT § 1 (4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (2005).
195. See About Chuck, U.S. SENATE, http://www.schumer.senate.gov/about-chuck (last visited
Feb. 5, 2016).
196. 142 CONG. REC. H1046001, H10461.
197. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015).
198. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015).
199. Mann, supra note 166, at 1808.
200. See id. at 1809–10.
201. SeeWiseman & Appenteng, supra note 19.
202. YEH, supra note 5, at 17.
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are several initiatives to combat trade secret theft, including enhancing
domestic law enforcement by making trade secret theft a priority, and
improving U.S. trade secrets legislation.203 In addition to this report, the
Senate proposed the DTSA of 2014, and the House of Representatives
introduced a companion bill, the Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014, to
provide further protection of domestic trade secrets.204 The DTSA of 2015
is substantially similar to the 2014 proposed bills,205 also allowing for ex
parte seizure of property upon a hearing showing that this seizure is
necessary to avoid disclosure of trade secret information.206 The DTSA of
2015 also sets a statute of limitations of five years and allows for remedies,
including injunctions, damages for actual loss and for unjust enrichment,
increased damages for willful and malicious misappropriation, and
attorney’s fees if a claim is made in bad faith.207 Finally, the DTSA of 2015
includes definitions for misappropriation and improper means that are
similar to the definitions set forth by the UTSA.208
The federal trade secrets statute called for in this Note is substantially
similar to the DTSA of 2015 that has been proposed by Congress. The
federal civil statute should allow for civil seizure, where the court can issue
an ex parte order to seize the stolen trade secret. However, to protect
property rights, there should be several prerequisites for the issuing of the
order. These requirements should include that before issuance, a court must
find that: (i) any other order available for issuance under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) will not successfully preserve the confidentiality
of the trade secret, (ii) there will be immediate harm if the seizure is not
ordered, (iii) the benefit of granting the order outweighs the harm that
would result from denying it, (iv) the information is a trade secret and the
person will likely misappropriate the secret if it is not seized, (v) the party
can prove that the trade secret in question belongs to them, and (vi) the
defendant may make the material inaccessible if it is not seized.209 The
justification for this order is that the court, by seizing the trade secret, can
preserve evidence and prevent additional harm to the corporation from
disclosure of the trade secret.210 This preservation of evidence justification
is similar to courts allowing for the seizure of property during a search
incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
A federal civil trade secrets statute should also include damages at
equity and at law. An injunction remedy should be included in the statute to
203. See id. at 17–18.
204. See generally id. at 28, 31.
205. Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014); Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014).
206. H.R. 3326, S. 1890.
207. See H.R. 3326, S. 1890.
208. See H.R. 3326, S. 1890.
209. H.R. 3326.
210. Abbott, supra note 43.
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prevent any further disclosure or harm that would result from the trade
secret theft. Money damages should be available as a remedy to compensate
the corporation for the misappropriation of a trade secret, including any
actual or potential loss incurred by the corporation. Monetary damages
would also compensate the corporation for the unjust enrichment to the
person who engaged in the theft or a competitor who receives the benefits
of the trade secret. These damages would prevent a hacker or employee
misappropriator from benefiting as a result of the theft of a corporation’s
trade secret. Punitive damages should be available to deter trade secret theft
by awarding additional damages for any willful or malicious
misappropriation. Finally, attorney’s fees should be available for any claims
brought in bad faith, which would help alleviate the possibility of a court
becoming backlogged with frivolous trade secret cases.211 By providing
damages and injunctive relief, federal trade secrets legislation would limit
the rewards from misappropriation of trade secrets, which would decrease
incentives to steal trade secrets and thereby inhibit the growth of trade
secret theft in the United States.212
In some cases of trade secret theft, excessive civil damages could have
the perverse effect of actually hurting the plaintiff’s ability to recover
losses. Where civil damage awards are significantly large, the defendant
may not be able to fully compensate the corporation’s losses, making these
damages insufficient to remunerate the corporation and deter future trade
secret theft.213 However, as the United States Chamber of Commerce stated,
“a combination of robust civil enforcement as well as criminal penalties is
important for protection of trade secrets.”214 Therefore, where a corporation
cannot be made whole through civil remedies, “strong criminal sanctions
can both complement and fill gaps in existing civil remedies.”215 An
example of this strategy is United States v. Kolon Industries Inc., a case
from 2012, where federal prosecutors indicted a South Korea-based
corporation for “conspiring to steal trade secrets” from an American
corporation, with the indictment carrying a loss of $225 million.216 In
addition to this substantial civil award, if found guilty, the South Korean
executives would face up to thirty years in prison for their crimes.217 The
same American corporation also filed a civil suit, E.I. du Pont de Nemours
and Company v. Kolon Industries Inc., where it was awarded $920 million
and an injunction.218 Moreover, in a case where a single employee may not
211. See H.R. 3326.
212. Abbott, supra note 43, at 4.
213. See CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION, supra note 10, at 13.
214. Id.
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be able to pay civil damages and criminal sanctions are not sought, a
plaintiff can bring a claim for vicarious liability requiring the corporation
that benefited from the stolen trade secret, which often has “deep pockets,”
to pay a portion of damages.219
A federal civil statute would also provide companies with access to
federal courts,220 without preempting current state law.221 Trade secrets are
the only significant type of intellectual property not governed by federal
law.222 Currently, federal law only governs trademarks, copyrights, and
patents,223 with federal courts having exclusive jurisdiction over patents.224
Trade secrets, on the other hand, are governed by state and common law.225
Therefore, the next logical step in the protection of trade secrets is the
enactment of a federal civil trade secrets statute to accompany the criminal
sanctions set forth in the NSPA and EEA.226 The principle of federalism,
which grants both the state and federal government the right to exercise
their own powers,227 would allow both federal and state trade secrets laws to
coexist. An example of federal and state intellectual property laws
coexisting is with trademarks, where the Lanham Act, a federal statute, and
state trademark laws have successfully coexisted for decades.228 A federal
statute would also provide for additional civil remedies, such as injunctions,
allow for the preservation of evidence and further prevention of disclosure
through ex parte seizures, while also providing additional compensation to
American corporations for the economic harm resulting from the theft and
misappropriation of trade secrets.229 These remedies are consistent with
those offered by federal law for patent, copyright, and trademark.230
The lack of a federal civil statute to protect trade secrets is problematic
because the absence of such a statute has allowed for inconsistencies in the
application of trade secrets legislation vital to the success of American
corporations.231 A federal trade secrets statute would remedy the lack of
uniformity that exists in current state laws.232 These state laws are
inconsistent and confusing because state legislatures modify their trade
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220. See Abbott, supra note 43, at 4.
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secret statutes often and state courts often apply these laws inconsistently
across cases.233 As stated by Congressman Jerrold Nadler, “[a] fifty-state
system does not work well in our increasingly mobile and globally
interconnected world.”234
Some scholars argue that a federal civil trade secrets statute would
provide more confusion because it does not preempt state law,235 but would
instead overlap state law.236 However, the very problem in the absence of a
federal law is the lack of uniformity that would in fact be remedied by a
federal law.237 The uniformity that would be accomplished by a federal
trade secrets law is important because it reduces uncertainties that arise out
of varying state laws.238 Further, the fact that some trade secrets would be
left uncovered by federal law because they do not involve a “product or
service” in interstate commerce,239 is not a persuasive argument to abandon
the federal trade secrets bills altogether. First, some of these trade secrets
may still be subject to federal jurisdiction under diversity jurisdiction or
supplemental jurisdiction. More importantly, simply because a slight
minority of trade secrets that are not involved in interstate or foreign
commerce240 would not be covered under the federal law does not mean that
the majority of trade secrets that would be covered should not be granted
stronger federal protections.
Another problem with the differences in state law is the issue arising
from the choice of law.241 The lack of a federal civil trade secrets statute
that provides uniform protection can prevent trade secret owners from
“vindicating their rights” when theft occurs across state lines or if the
defendant attempts to flee the country.242 In cases where the plaintiff
corporation and the defendant who stole the corporation’s trade secret
reside in different states, the corporation would be uncertain about which
state’s law would apply.243 In federal court, it is clear that federal law would
apply and companies can look to precedent (once developed) to determine
the viability of their case prior to a trial. Similarly, increasing employee
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mobility, where employees change jobs more frequently, often moving to
different states exacerbates the choice of law problem, making it difficult
for corporations to effectively protect their trade secrets from theft and
misappropriation nationwide.244 Employee mobility increases the risk of
trade secret misappropriation by creating an opportunity for a past
employee to use the former employer’s trade secret in his or her new
position in a different state.245 This again creates a choice of law issue
where the corporation and employee reside in different states.246 However,
granting access to federal courts under a federal civil statute can mitigate
these issues because one uniform federal law would apply and federal
courts have a greater ability to “facilitate discovery, serve defendants or
witnesses, or prevent a party from leaving the country.”247
Although choice of law issues may still arise when trade secret claims
are intertwined with employment and contract claims governed by differing
state law,248 such choice of law issues would still exist in these cases even
in the absence of a federal civil statute. Therefore, a choice of law issue for
employment or contract claims is an unpersuasive argument for rejection of
a federal law with several benefits specifically when federal courts are
better suited to deal with issues arising across state and national boundaries,
because they often deal with diverse litigants.
A benefit of a federal civil trade secrets statute is that it provides
“emergency relief.”249 Although it can be argued that a federal trade secrets
statute would result in greater risk of “accidental disclosure of the trade
secrets”250 by providing for emergency relief, a federal court is authorized
to seize the trade secret to prevent its promulgation where irreparable injury
would occur,251 therefore mitigating any harm to the corporation resulting
from the disclosure of the trade secret. Furthermore, the federal civil statute
would allow for this relief to be ex parte, where there is no requirement for
the “presence or participation” of the party opposing the seizure.252 The
arguments that ex parte relief can inhibit competition253 and be abused254 are
also unpersuasive. There are several safeguards to prevent the issues
surrounding ex parte relief in both the DTSA and the statute proposed in
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this Note, such as requiring an adequate showing of necessity by the
applicant, a showing that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur,” and
a cost-benefit analysis concluding that the benefit of granting the seizure
will outweigh any potential harm to third parties.255 In addition to these
safeguards, a judge can prevent and punish any instances of “foul play.”256
The safeguards against infringing on competition and business practices,
coupled with the benefits of stronger protection and emergency relief,
makes the passing of a federal civil trade secrets statute the best option to
afford trade secrets the appropriate legal tools needed to enforce a
corporation’s right to protect their trade secrets and preserve their economic
value to the corporation and the United States.
CONCLUSION
With the growth of the Internet and the explosion of cybercrime, trade
secrets have become increasingly vulnerable to theft, increasing the need
for greater legal protection. The NSPA needs to be amended to better
protect trade secrets by encompassing the intangible trade secrets that
contribute to a substantial amount of a corporation’s economic value and
United States GDP. By amending the NSPA, a loophole that currently
exists relating to intangible assets would be closed, allowing for unanimity
in similar cases of trade secret theft by punishing the theft of the trade
secrets and the subsequent misappropriation of those trade secrets, rather
than focusing on the form in which the trade secrets were stolen.
Moreover, a federal civil law should be passed to provide an
overarching framework for civil trade secrets protection to allow
corporations with trade secret theft claims access to federal courts. Federal
courts can provide civil remedies, such as injunctive relief and damages, to
corporations who have suffered economic harm because of trade secret
theft, as well as emergency relief, such as ex parte seizure, to prevent
further irreparable injury to the corporation. Finally, the federal court
system is better suited to deal with diverse parties from different states or
countries and those defendants who attempt to flee the country in an effort
to escape liability for their actions. With these two statutes in place, a
corporation’s most valuable economic property would be better protected,
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